T 2 The Replaceability Argument in the 3 Ethics of Animal Husbandry 4Au1 Nicolas Delon 5 Department of Environmental Studies, New York 6 University, New York, NY, USA 7Au4 Synonyms 8 Conscientious omnivorism; Happy meat; Sustain9 able meat production 10 Introduction 11 Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suf12 fering upon animals is wrong.Many fewer people, 13 including among ethicists, agree that painlessly 14 killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most 15 commonly cited reason is that death (without 16 pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way 17 that matters morally or not as significantly as it 18 does for persons, who are self-conscious, make 19 long-term plans, and have preferences about their 20 own future. Animals, at least those that are not 21 persons, lack a morally significant interest in con22 tinuing to live. At the same time, some argue that 23 existence itself can be good, insofar as one's life is 24 worth living. For animals, a good life can offset a 25 quick, if early, death. So, it seems to follow that 26 breeding happy animals that will be (prematurely) 27 killed can be a good thing overall. Insofar as 28slaughter and sale makes it economically sustain29able to raise new ones, who would otherwise not 30exist, raising and killing animals for food who will 31have lives worth living is good overall. It benefits 32them as well as consumers and makes the world 33better by adding to the sum of happiness. The 34process of raising and killing animals with posi35tive welfare produces a sequence of replacement 36that maintains or increases overall welfare, all else 37being equal (assuming in particular no overall 38negative impact on the welfare of other parties). 39Call this the replaceability argument (RA) and the 40ensuing controversy the replaceability problem 41(RP). This is a problem at the crossroads of the 42ethics of killing, agricultural ethics, procreation 43ethics, and population ethics. Peter Singer gave 44the idea its most precise and controversial formu45lation in Practical Ethics (2011: Chapter 5), first 46published in 1979. 47History of the Problem 48In 1789, in the Introduction to the Principles of 49Morals and Legislation, Bentham (1907) wrote: 50If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason 51why we should be suffered to eat such of them 52[animals] as we like to eat: we are the better for it, 53and they are never the worse. They have none of 54those long-protracted anticipations of future misery 55which we have. The death they suffer in our hands 56commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by 57that means a less painful one, than that which would 58await them in the inevitable course of nature.. . . # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 P.B. Thompson, D.M. Kaplan (eds.), Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_512-1 59 [W]e should be the worse for their living, and they 60 are never the worse for being dead. But is there any 61 reason why we should be suffered to torment them? 62 Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should 63 not be suffered to torment them? Yes, several. 64 Bentham went on to formulate his oft-quoted 65 criterion for equal consideration: 66 It may come one day to be recognized, that the 67 number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the 68 termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally 69 insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the 70 same fate. What else is it that should trace the 71 insuperable line? . . . the question is not, Can they 72 reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? 73 (Bentham 1907: XVII.1) 74 Bentham, the founder of classical utilitarian75 ism, appears to endorse a version of RA: pain76 lessly killing animals makes everyone better off 77 than they would otherwise be – it does not harm 78 them –meat eaters are better for it. Given the more 79 sophisticated cognition of mature human beings, 80 killing them requires stronger justifications, 81 although Bentham believed the main reason 82 against murder lied in the terror (foreclosed to 83 animals) it would induce in other people. 84 Early animal rights advocate Henry Salt, 85 despite Bentham's influence, called RA "the 86 logic of the larder" (1914). Salt was responding 87 to the essayist Leslie Stephen's (1896) argument 88 against vegetarianism: 89 Of all the arguments for Vegetarianism none is so 90 weak as the argument from humanity. The pig has a 91 stronger interest than anyone in the demand for 92 bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would 93 be no pigs at all. 94 Salt took Stephen's remark to be premised on a 95 fallacy: 96 It is often said, as an excuse for the slaughter of 97 animals, that it is better for them to live and to be 98 butchered than not to live at all. Now, obviously, if 99 such reasoning justifies the practice of flesh-eating, 100 it must equally justify all breeding of animals for 101 profit or pastime, when their life is a fairly happy 102 one. . . . In fact . . . there is hardly any treatment that 103 cannot be justified by the supposed terms of such a 104 contract. Also, the argument must apply to man105 kind. . . .The fallacy lies in the confusion of thought 106 which attempts to compare existence with 107 non-existence. A person who is already in existence 108 may feel that he would rather have lived than not, 109 but he must first have the terra firma of existence to 110argue from; the moment he begins to argue as if 111from the abyss of the non-existent, he talks non112sense, by predicating good or evil, happiness or 113unhappiness, of that of which we can predicate 114nothing. (Salt 1914: 221–222) 115Peter Singer, in the first edition of Animal 116Liberation (1975: Chapter 6), agreed with Salt. 117He changed his view while writing Practical 118Ethics (first published in 1979, revised in 1993 119and 2011), influenced by ingenious arguments put 120forward in the late 1970s by Derek Parfit about 121impersonal wrongs and the widely discussed 122"nonidentity problem" (1984: 351–374). Based 123on the fictional case of two prospective mothers 124and medical programs (367), Parfit showed that 125one could act wrongly without harming anyone in 126particular. Despite a plausible asymmetry 127between harms and benefits, and the fact that 128parents are under no obligation to bring to life a 129child whose existence will very likely be happy, 130one needs to explain why it is wrong to bring a 131miserable being into existence (even one who 132would otherwise not exist) yet not equally good 133to bring a happy being into existence. "Sound 134explanations for this," Singer and Mason wrote, 135"are extraordinarily difficult to find" (2006: 252). 136It may be at most "morally neutral" (optional), but 137it is at least good. 138Structure of the Argument 139In its basic form, RA states that one can increase 140or maximize value in the world (happiness, plea141sure, preference satisfaction, objective list) by 142increasing the number of happy or fulfilled sen143tient beings. Applied to farming, it states that 144humanely raised animals (HRAs) that live pleas145ant lives and can be killed without pain and dis146tress can be replaced, without loss, by new HRAs, 147which thus offset the good prevented by the kill148ing. Humanely raising and killing animals bene149fits animals, consumers, and the world. 150There are twoways to interpret the offsetting of 151an early death by a good life: either animals are 152personally better off with a happy, if short life, 153than with no life at all or, even if the personal harm 154of death is not offset by the benefit of existence, 2 The Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry 155 the impersonal marginal benefit "for the world" 156 offsets the total sum of personal harms. Each 157 interpretation requires different arguments: either 158 to the effect that death does not significantly harm 159 animals (so the net sum of personal benefits minus 160 harms for the individual is positive) or that imper161 sonal benefits may override personal harms 162 (so the overall sum of benefits minus harms, for 163 all affected, is positive). Either way, one has to 164 show that the total benefits of eating meat out165 weigh the costs to animals (McMahan 2008). 166 Contemporary Applications 167 In the context of intensified industrialized farm168 ing, critiques and alternative methods have 169 flourished. A popular trend in animal husbandry, 170 espoused by food writers, celebrity farmers, and 171 academics, focuses on the possibility of eating 172 better and treating animals better – in part by 173 eating fewer of them. "Conscientious," "ethical," 174 or "compassionate" omnivores embrace the 175 humane, pasture-based, grass-fed, and, often176 times, organic and local production of meat as a 177 sustainable solution in the ailments of the modern 178 Western diet. Humane husbandry and a conscien179 tious omnivore diet minimize environmental dam180 age, animal suffering, and public health issues 181 while preserving a (culturally, aesthetically, and 182 economically) worthwhile practice. Animals, in 183 exchange for life and care, offer us their own 184 life. Ethically produced meat ideally comes from 185 free-ranging animals who enjoyed (slightly) 186 extended life spans (allowing animals to live 187 their expected natural life span would dramati188 cally increase market prices), increased outdoor 189 access, environmental enrichment, a more natural 190 diet (grass, organic cereals, fruits, vegetables, 191 roots), and social relations. Contemporary practi192 tioners and/or advocates include Hugh Fearnley193 Whittingstall (2004), Nicolette Niman, Joel 194 Salatin (Polyface Farms), Michael Pollan (2006), 195 and Allan Savory, among others. 196 There is another purported benefit of hus197 bandry to animals. Its end would not only deprive 198 billions of future individuals of a good life, it 199 would ultimately mean phasing out entire 200domesticated species and breeds. Thus, Pollan 201writes, chickens "depend for their well-being on 202the existence of their human predators. Not the 203individual chicken, perhaps, but Chicken – the 204species. The surest way to achieve the extinction 205of the species would be to grant chickens a right to 206life." (2006: 322). This is assuming, controver207sially, that limited populations of such breeds or 208species would not thrive in the wild or sanctuaries. 209This is also suggesting, again controversially, that 210these kinds have intrinsic value and lack wild 211counterparts. Moreover, RA only applies to 212those individuals and kinds that would not exist 213otherwise, hence, for instance, not to wild-caught 214fish or independently reproducing game. Finally, 215any given type of agriculture will affect the num216ber, species, and well-being of the animals that 217will exist on the land used or converted (Matheny 218and Chan 2005). There is also a widespread 219assumption that domestication is an advantageous 220bargain for animals, insofar as husbandry pro221vides for their needs, food, shelter, veterinary 222care, and protection against predators and diseases 223and ensures the reproductive success of the popu224lation (Budiansky 1999; Pollan 2006), but as sec225tion "Philosophical Controversy" shows, such 226comparisons involve complicated metaphysical 227questions. 228In the actual world, RA strikes more directly at 229veganism than ovo-lacto-vegetarianism, since 230producing dairy, eggs, and other animal 231by-products cannot be dissociated from killing, 232in part because the profitability of livestock 233depends on the marketability of by-products and 234because male calves and chicks and spent females 235are not useful to the industry. Critics, on the other 236hand, point out that, even granting its validity, the 237logic of the larder does not entail that such prac238tices will be morally acceptable. RA entails, at 239best, that one could hypothetically have reasons 240to eat animals – with meat probably becoming a 241luxury good (McMahan 2008). But further obsta242cles stand in the way of even heirloom husbandry: 243the unreliability of labels; inevitability of slaugh244terhouses for animals raised for commercial pur245poses; limitations of mobile slaughter units and 246gruesomeness of "backyard butchers" 247(McWilliams 2015); reduced life spans; motherThe Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry 3 248 offspring separation; castration, clipping, 249 docking, and other mutilations; increased mortal250 ity and morbidity rates; and environmental con251 cerns (waste, GHG emissions, land and water 252 use), let alone empirical and ethical uncertain 253 ties regarding the badness of death for real and 254 hypothetical HRAs (Višak and Garner 2016). 255 Singer and Mason (2006) note: "[humanely 256 raised] cattle, like all the animals we eat, died 257 while still very young. They might have lived 258 several more years before meeting one of these 259 other forms of death, years in which they matured, 260 experienced sexual intercourse, and, if they were 261 females, cared for their children" (253). There262 fore, even without granting animals a right to 263 life, RA does not settle by itself the permissibility 264 of the current humane omnivore diet. 265 Philosophical Controversy 266 Philosophers accepting RA (e.g., Hare 1999; 267 Scruton 2004; Singer 2011; Varner 2012) assume 268 at least a version of these two claims: death is not a 269 significant harm to nonperson animals; existence 270 is better than nonexistence (for HRAs, other sen271 tient beings, and/or from the point of view of the 272 universe). Singer and Varner also accept that these 273 may be matters of degree. 274 Hare, Singer's mentor at Oxford, considered 275 Stephen's comparison very sensible: "happy 276 existing people are certainly glad they exist, and 277 so are presumably comparing their existence with 278 a possible non-existence" (1999: 239). IfAu2 he were 279 to choose between the life of a trout in a small 280 farm in the English countryside, Hare would 281 certainly "prefer the life, all told, of such a fish, 282 to that of almost any fish in the wild, and to 283 non-existence" (240). 284 Singer (2011: Chapter 5) now accepts that a 285 good if short life is better than nonexistence. Sen286 tient life even has a preference-independent 287 (objective) value, such that more good lives are 288 better than either a less happy or a non-sentient 289 universe. These claims are even easier for Singer 290 to accept now that he espouses hedonistic 291 act-utilitarianism (Lazari-Radek and Singer 292 2014): the permissibility of a given act of killing 293depends on the overall resulting balance of enjoy294ment and suffering. On this view, persons are also 295replaceable, although, given the richness of their 296lives and the numerous side effects, not as easily 297as merely sentient beings (also see Varner 2012). 298Distinctions 299At the crux of RP stand unresolved questions in 300moral theory, applied ethics, and axiology (Višak 301and Garner 2016): When is death a harm? What is 302the relevant point of comparison to assess 303(momentary or lifetime) welfare? How does a 304short happy life compare with nonexistence, life 305in the wild, or a longer life? Each comparison has 306its own complications, including nonidentity 307problems between wild and domesticated ani308mals, different generations, and different life 309stages of individuals. 310The theoretical application of RA to nonperson 311animals, but not to persons (self-conscious, ratio312nal, and autonomous), hinges on the assumption 313that death is normally distinctively bad for the 314latter if their lives are worth living. Death can be 315a tragedy only for persons. RA thus rests on two 316central distinctions: suffering versus death and 317persons versus nonpersons, which may explain 318why many people opposing animal suffering do 319not necessarily oppose the killing of animals for 320food, and why people who would consider killing 321human beings, including anencephalic children, 322for horrific medical research generally accept 323experimenting on at least as sentient nonhumans. 324Non-speciesists substitute persons/nonpersons for 325humans/nonhumans, since some nonhumans can 326be persons (e.g., great apes and cetaceans) and not 327all humans are persons (e.g., fetuses and anence328phalic children). Even a non-speciesist can there329fore deny that the death of a cow and the death of a 330normal human being are on a par, given their 331different cognitive capacities (Bentham 1907; 332Singer 2011; Varner 2012). 333Metaphysical Issues 334Utilitarian versions of RA depend on the crucial 335assumption that the interests of nonexisting 336beings matter – not simply those of beings that 337do exist or will exist (regardless of one's choices) 338but also those of beings who would exist if one 4 The Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry 339 chose to bring them into existence (i.e., whose 340 existence and identity depend on one's choices). 341 The question is whether the interests of already 342 conceived future children matter like those of 343 merely possible children. If interests count only 344 once one has determined that a being will exist, it 345 is problematic to balance the interests of possible 346 farm animals against their interests if they exist. 347 Critics of RA say one ought to ensure existing 348 animals are made as happy as possible when they 349 are alive but ought not to make as many happy 350 beings as possible (Višak 2013). 351 RA proponents can press that acknowledging 352 that existence can be good implies that existence 353 can be better than nonexistence (benefit) and 354 hence that nonexistence can be worse (harm). 355 RA opponents insist that nonexisting beings 356 have no welfare so there is no one for whom 357 existing is better than never existing. Existence, 358 on this view, is an absolute, i.e., non-comparative, 359 benefit. Secondly, accepting that existing beings 360 can prefer their existence to nonexistence does not 361 commit one to accept that merely possible beings 362 would prefer a short happy life to no life at all. In 363 fact, preferring existence to never existing may as 364 well count against killing (no longer existing). It 365 is an open question whether absolute benefits can 366 compensate for harms such as death, but it is 367 plausible that happy animals, if they were in a 368 position to assess such benefits and harms, 369 would prefer life to death. They would, moreover, 370 not be swayed by the fact that, had one not 371 planned to kill them, they would not exist, since 372 existence is not a comparative benefit. 373 Utilitarianism 374 Hare (1999: 239–239) makes a clear utilitarian 375 case for replaceability: 376 doing wrong to animals must involve harming 377 them. If there is no harm, there is no wrong. Further, 378 it has to be harm overall; if a course of action 379 involves some harms but greater benefits, and 380 there is no alternative with a greater balance of 381 good over harm, it will not be wrong. We have to 382 ask, therefore, whether the entire process of raising 383 animals and then killing them to eat causes them 384 more harm overall than benefit. My answer is that, 385 assuming, as we must assume if we are to keep the 386 "killing" argument distinct from the "suffering" 387argument, that they are happy while they live, it 388does not. For it is better for an animal to have a 389happy life, even if it is a short one, than no life at all. 390Although, existence is not "a benefit in itself," 391"it is a necessary condition for having the benefits 392that we can have only if we are alive" (239). 393Existence can be compared (and preferred) to 394nonexistence and existence allows for more pref395erences to be satisfied. Hare endorses total 396(as opposed to average and person-affecting) 397utilitarianism – i.e., we ought to "maximize the 398total amount of preference-satisfaction that is had 399in the world . . . and distribute it impartially." 400Painlessly killing animals, as opposed to making 401them suffer, does not frustrate their preferences. 402Assuming there are no uncompensated negative 403side effects, the permissibility of killing thus 404depends on "how many live animals, of different 405species including the human, we ought to cause 406there to be" or, more accurately, the number of 407quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) (239). Hare 408concludes that traditional "organic" husbandry 409(replaceability), especially in parts of the world 410where growing crops is impractical, is 411optimific. Note that Hare's argument is stronger 412than Singer's theoretical endorsement of 413replaceability. It states not only that replacing 414animals is permissible, but that it is required 415when optimific. Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014) 416have recently come closer to such a view 417(hedonism aside). 418As is clear, RA follows naturally from certain 419versions of utilitarianism. In fact, Pollan's (2006) 420defense of meat, besides its empirical and axio421logical assumptions (predation as symbiosis; spe422cies matter more than individuals), echoes 423utilitarian commitments (Singer and Mason 4242006: 252). Replaceability is, indeed, a crucial 425ground for deontological and rights-based objec426tions to utilitarianism, insofar as the latter sees 427individuals as replaceable "receptacles of value" 428(pleasurable experiences) (Regan 1983). Yet, 429while RA squares well with utilitarianism, 430rejecting its conclusion need not entail rejecting 431utilitarianism. 432Further distinctions are necessary here. There 433are personal and impersonal values, which can be The Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry 5 434 ranked differently. A state of affair can be imper435 sonally good independently of its goodness-for436 particular beings, from what Sidgwick called "the 437 point of view of the universe." The existence of 438 more happy animals might be impersonally better 439 even if it were better for no one in particular. On 440 the other hand, states of affairs can be personally 441 better or worse for those existing in such states. 442 Happy/long lives are better for cows than short/ 443 miserable lives. So, a state of affairs could be 444 personally worse than its alternatives while 445 being impersonally better: e.g., replaceability is 446 worse for cows, who live shorter lives than they 447 could and are not better off for existing, but the 448 world is better in virtue of containing more hap449 piness than a world of irreplaceable cows. 450 On total impersonal utilitarianism, impartiality 451 requires that one weighs the interests of actual 452 (present and future) beings and possible beings 453 equally, in proportion to their strength rather than 454 whose interests they are. But several authors 455 emphasize the compatibility of prior-existence/ 456 person-affecting utilitarianism (let alone rule con457 sequentialism) with the irreplaceability of persons 458 or of all sentient beings. They assume, as men459 tioned earlier, that nonexisting animals have no 460 welfare, so they cannot be harmed or benefitted by 461 existence or nonexistence. The interests of possi462 ble beings thus do not matter as much, if at all, as 463 those of actual beings (Sapontzis 1987; Višak 464 2013; cf. Parfit's 1984 and Singer's 2011 [1979, 465 1993] discussion). These views thus reject a cen466 tral tenet of RA. 467 Both person-affecting and impersonal views 468 may have bullets to bite. The former are hard469 pressed to account for the intrinsic wrongness of 470 breeding animals that will undergo lives of suffer471 ing, if one cannot be harmed by being brought into 472 existence. Of course, once one exists, it is wrong 473 to be made to suffer. But one lacks direct reasons, 474 on the person-affecting view, to avoid breeding 475 animals that will have miserable lives as a result of 476 genetic defects or induced disabilities. 477 Wide-person-affecting views, however, offer 478 interesting resources (Višak 2013). On the other 479 hand, purely impersonal views cannot easily 480 account for the intrinsic wrongness of killing and 481 involve comparisons between states of affairs that 482are not straightforwardly meaningful from the 483point of view of those they affect. They can accept 484that not breeding conscious animals has neutral 485(neither positive nor negative) value. But they 486cannot make a difference between the good that 487is achieved by prolonging an existing being's life 488and creating beings that would not otherwise have 489existed. Moreover, hedonistic impersonal utilitar490ians lack resources to account for the distinctive 491wrongness of killing persons except in terms of 492their side effects on other parties and the relative 493richness of their future lives, all of which can be 494compensated for on such views. Singer's chang495ing views over the editions of Practical Ethics are 496representative of these difficulties. His recent shift 497from preference utilitarianism to hedonism 498deprives him of his previous arguments for the 499irreplaceability of persons. 500To conclude, RP thus leaves us with the theo501retical challenge of providing a compelling case 502for the replaceability of nonpersons that does not 503apply to persons. Most authors either accept 504replaceability for both persons and nonpersons 505(Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014; Varner 2012) or 506deny it for both (Višak 2013). Further, practically, 507RP does not settle all of the morally relevant 508aspects of animal husbandry. The best defense of 509conscientious omnivores rests on several empiri510cal and philosophical assumptions still being 511hotly debated (McWilliams 2015; Višak and Gar512ner 2016). 513Conclusion 514Controversies Au3regarding the ethics of animal hus515bandry and eating meat sometimes revolve around 516the idea of replaceability, namely, that killing cer517tain animals can be permissible insofar as they 518live pleasant lives and are replaced by new ani519mals with equally pleasant lives. The controver520sies touch upon foundational issues in moral 521theory, practical ethics, as well as contemporary 522discussions of "ethical," "conscientious," or 523"humane" omnivores. 6 The Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry 524 Cross-References 525 ▶Meat: Ethical Considerations 526 ▶ Peter Singer and Food 527 ▶ Sustainability and Animal Agriculture 528 ▶Vegetarianism 529 References 530 Bentham, J. (1907). Introduction to the principles of 531 morals and legislation. Oxford: Clarendon [first pub. 532 1789]. 533 Budiansky, S. (1999). The covenant of the wild. New 534 Haven: Yale University Press. 535 Fearnley-Whittingstall, H. (2004). The river cottage meat 536 book. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 537 Hare, R. M. (1999). Why I am only a demi-vegetarian. In 538 D. Jamieson (Ed.), Singer and his critics. Oxford: 539 Blackwell [first pub. 1993]. 540 de Lazari-Radek, K., & Singer, P. (2014). The point of view 541 of the universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 542 McMahan, J. (2008). Eating animals the nice way. 543 Daedalus, 137(1), 66–76. 544 Matheny, G., & Chan, K. M. A. (2005). Human diets and 545 animal welfare: The illogic of the larder. Journal of 546 Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 18(6), 547 579–594. 548McWilliams, J. (2015). The modern savage. New York: 549Thomas Dunne Books. 550Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: 551Clarendon. 552Pollan, M. (2006). The omnivore's dilemma. New York: 553Penguin. 554Regan, T. (1983). The case for animal rights. Berkeley: 555The University of California Press. 556Salt, H. S. (1914). The logic of the larder. In The human557ities of diet. Manchester: The Vegetarian Society. 558Sapontzis, S. F. (1987). Morals, reason, and animals. 559Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 560Scruton, R. (2004). The conscientious carnivore. In 561S. F. Sapontzis (Ed.), Food for thought. Amherst: 562Prometheus. 563Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation. New York: Random 564House [revised 1990]. 565Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge: 566Cambridge University Press [first published 1979; 567revised 1993]. 568Singer, P., & Mason, J. (2006). The ethics of what we eat. 569Emmaus: Rodale Books. 570Stephen, L. (1896). Social rights and duties (Vol. 1). Lon571don: S. Sonnenschein. 572Varner, G. (2012). Personhood, ethics, and animal cogni573tion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 574Višak, T. (2013). Killing happy animals. Basingstoke: Pal575grave MacMillan. 576Višak, T., & Garner, R. (Eds.). (2016). The ethics of killing 577animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Replaceability Argument in the Ethics of Animal Husbandry 7 Author Queries Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics Chapter No: 512-1 ___________________________________________________________________ Query Refs. Details Required Author's response AU1 Please check if your affiliation(s) and, if applicable, that/ those of your co-author(s) are correct and complete. AU2 Please check sentence starting "If he were to choose between. . ." for completeness. AU3 Heading Summary has been changed to Conclusion to maintain consistency across all chapters in the handbook. AU4 Please Provide Keywords Note: If you are using material from other works please make sure that you have obtained the necessary permission from the copyright holders and that references to the original publications are included. Insert "and never existing" between "countryside" and comma OK OK vegetarianism, veganism, meat, husbandry, humane, killing, death, Peter Singer, omnivore